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Abstract. In 2019, Gu Chunsheng introduced Integer-RLWE, a variant
of RLWE devoid of some of its efficiency flaws. Most notably, he proposes
a setting where n can be an arbitrary positive integer, contrarily to the
typical construction n = 2k. In this paper, we analyze the new prob-
lem and implement the classical meet-in-the-middle and lattice-based
attacks. We then use the peculiarity of the construction of n to build an
improved lattice-based attack in cases where n is composite with an odd
divisor. For example, for parameters n = 2000 and q = 233, we reduce
the estimated complexity of the attack from 2288 to 2164. We also present
reproducible experiments confirming our theoretical results.
Keywords: Post-quantum cryptography · Meet-in-the-middle · Lattice-
based attack · I-RLWE
1 Introduction
With the advent of quantum computers, cryptographers have begun a consis-
tent search for new trapdoor functions to use as building blocks for public-key
cryptographic protocols that are resistant to quantum attacks.
In 2006, Regev introduced the Learning With Errors (LWE) [18] problem, one
of the most important candidate trapdoors in post-quantum cryptography today.
This problem has gained the trust of researchers thanks to its simplicity and its
connection to lattice theory, which has been studied for years and provides us
with useful security estimates. However, cryptosystems based on LWE present
the disadvantage of having large public key sizes. In order to overcome this
problem, Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev introduced Ring-LWE (RLWE) in
2010 [17], a related problem that allows smaller key sizes and more efficient
encryption and decryption.
Informally, let R = Q[x]/(xn + 1) and let Rq = R/qR, for an integer n > 1
and a prime q. The Search RLWE problem consists in finding the secret s ∈ Rq
given samples of the form (a,b = as + e) ∈ Rq ×Rq, where e ∈ Rq is a “small”
polynomial drawn from a certain distribution. Another variant of the problem is
the Decision RLWE, which consists in distinguishing the pairs (a,b = as + e) ∈
Rq ×Rq from pairs drawn uniformly at random from Rq ×Rq.
However, efficiency varies over different polynomial rings in RLWE and a
dedicated optimization is required for each one of them. To overcome this incon-
venience, Gu Chunsheng introduced a variant of RLWE named Integer-RLWE
(I-RLWE) [12]. In this new problem the variable x in RLWE is substituted with
a prime q and the space of keys Rq is substituted with Zp, i.e. the set of integers




i and e =
∑n−1
i=0 eiq
i such that si and ei are “small”.
In his work, Gu also presented a public-key encryption protocol based on
I-RLWE. It is therefore important to analyze this problem and gain a better
understanding of the security it offers.
It is worth mentioning that a similar work has been done by Aggarwal et al.
[1], who introduced an integer-version of the NTRU protocol, and by Beunardeau
et al. [6] and de Boer et al. [7], who cryptanalyzed it. Moreover, a module version
of I-RLWE is used in ThreeBears [13], a candidate protocol in the NIST Post-
Quantum Standardization Process.
1.1 Contribution
In this paper, we analyze the complexity of the I-RLWE problem.
We provide some background and notation in Section 2. In Section 3 we
adapt two standard attacks to this problem, namely a meet-in-the-middle attack
and a lattice-based attack. These two attacks are straightforward to adapt to
the problem, thus providing an upper bound for the acceptable complexity of
further attacks with minimal effort; studying these attacks is a natural choice.
We adapt the meet-in-the-middle attack of Cheon et al. on Decision LWE [10] to
Search I-RLWE, and analyze its complexity. Likewise, we produce a lattice-based
attack and follow the analysis of Alkim et al. [4] to determine its complexity.
In his work [12], Gu introduces a setting in which q = 2t, instead of a prime,
and n can be any positive integer, instead of n = 2k. We exploit this setting
to construct a new lattice-based attack for cases where n is neither prime nor a
power of two and q is an arbitrary positive integer. Together with the outline of
the attack, we show in Section 4 how these weak choices of n lead to a drastic
drop in the estimated security of I-RLWE. Furthermore, we provide experiments
supporting our theoretical estimates in Section 5. Finally we give our conclusions
in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
We denote the set of the real, rational and integer numbers with R,Q,Z re-
spectively. Bold lower case letters represent vectors. For a given vector v, vj
represents its j-th component. For a positive integer p, we write Zp = Z/pZ.
Furthermore, the notation [a]p ∈ {0, ..., p− 1} indicates a mod p and, similarly,
[v]p is the vector composed by the entries of the integer vector v reduced modulo
p. The notation ‖v‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of v. Matrices are denoted with
upper case bold M.
Let q be an odd prime and let p = qn + 1, for n > 1 integer. Given a ∈
Zp\{p−1}, let a′ be the integer representative of a in {0, ..., p−2}. We denote with





Similarly, if we represent a 6= p2 with the integer a
′ ∈
{





we can uniquely write a′ =
∑n−1
i=0 aiq
i, with ai ∈
{




. Hence we will
write a = (a0, a1, ..., an−1) ∈
{





We use the symbol≈B to denote the reflexive and symmetric relation between
two vectors x ≈B y iff ‖x − y‖∞ ≤ B for some positive integer B < q2 . In a
natural way we can extend this relation to x, y ∈ Zp applying the relation above
to the vectors of the corresponding components in base q.
2.1 Discrete Gaussian Distributions
In the following we write x ∼ D to mean that the random variable x follows
the distribution D. Let ρ0,σ(x) be the probability distribution function of the
Gaussian distribution N(0, σ) with mean 0 and variance σ2. We denote with
DZ,σ the discrete Gaussian distribution on Z with mean 0 and variance σ2 that







Given n independent random variables x1, ..., xn ∼ DZ,σ, we assume y =
∑n
i=1 xi
follows the distribution DZ,σ
√
n. This is a common assumption in this field and
it comes from the approximation of the discrete Gaussian distribution with the
continuous one. With the notation v ← DZn,σ we indicate a vector in Zn with
entries sampled independently at random from DZ,σ.
Furthermore, we denote with UZq the uniform distribution over Zq and, sim-
ilarly, v ← UZnq is a vector in Z
n
q with entries sampled independently and uni-
formly at random from Zq.
2.2 Lattices
In this subsection we recall some important definitions and notions of lattice
theory. For a more detailed resource on this topic, we refer the reader to [15].
A lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of Rn. Let b1, ...,bm ∈ Rn be a set
of linearly independent vectors. We define the lattice generated by b1, ...,bm as
L(b1, ...,bm) =
{
v ∈ Rn : v =
m∑
i=1
αibi, αi ∈ Z
}
.
A basis is any set of linearly independent vectors that generates the lattice
as a Z-module and the dimension is the number of vectors in a basis. Let B
a matrix whose rows form a basis of L, we then define the volume of L as
Vol(L) =
√
det(BTB). Unless differently specified, we consider full-rank lattices
through this paper — that is, the case when m = n.
Definition 1. Let b1, ...,bn ∈ Rn be a set of linearly independent vectors. We
denote with b∗1, ...,b
∗
n the Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalization of b1, ...,bn
defined as follows:
b∗1 = b1, b
∗









b∗j , for 1 < i ≤ n.
Definition 2. Given a basis of a lattice L and a gap factor α ≥ 1, the unique
Shortest Vector Problem (uSVPα) is to find (if it exists) the unique non-zero
v ∈ L such that any u ∈ L with ‖u‖ ≤ α‖v‖ is an integral multiple of v.
Estimating the complexity to solve uSVP is a central problem in lattice-based
cryptography. The following, known as Gaussian Heuristic, gives us an estimate
of the length of the shortest vector in a random lattice.
Heuristic 1. Let L be a full-rank lattice of dimension n and let v ∈ L be a






2.3 Integer Ring-Learning With Errors
Let q, n be two positive integers such that q is prime and q > n3, and let
p = qn + 1.
Definition 3. Let s ← DZn,σ be secret. Given an arbitrary number of samples
of the form
(a, b = as+ e mod p) ∈ Zp × Zp, (1)
where a ← UZp and e ← DZn,σ, the Search Integer-RLWE problem is to
retrieve the secret s.
Definition 4. Let s← DZn,σ be secret. The Decision Integer-RLWE problem
is to distinguish with non-negligible advantage between an arbitrary number of
samples of the form
(a, b = as+ e mod p) ∈ Zp × Zp, (2)
where a ← UZp and e ← DZn,σ, and the same number of samples drawn uni-
formly at random from Zp × Zp.
In Section 3, we will consider n to be a power of 2 and σ =
√
n, as suggested
by Gu [12] in the original definition. However, we will exploit a relaxation on
n claimed in Remark 4.1 of [12] to build a more efficient attack in Section 4.
Furthermore, the notation I-RLWE will refer to Search I-RLWE, which is the
version of the problem that we address.
3 Standard Attacks
3.1 Meet-in-the-Middle attack
A classical meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack on LWE was previously described [10].
Due to the connection I-RLWE has to the aforementioned problem, we follow
the exact same methodology to perform our attack. We also draw inspiration
from the work of de Boer et al. on the AJPS Mersenne-Based Cryptosystem [7].
Consider an I-RLWE sample (a, b = as+ e mod p). Let v = s mod qn/2 and
w = s− v. For the MITM approach, we consider the noisy relation
aw ≈B b− av
We start by building a table
T =
{
(av, v) : v = (x,y),x ∈ {−B, . . . , B}n/2,y ∈ {0}n/2
}
⊂ Zp × Zp
where B parameterizes the probability of finding the right secret depending on
n. The probability that a given component of s falls in the range {−B, . . . , B}
is given by PB = P(x ∈ {−B, . . . , B} : x ∼ N(0, σ)). It follows that the proba-
bility of all the components of s and e to fall in the range {−B, . . . , B} is P 2nB .
The second part of the MITM attack consists in an exhaustive search for y
such that y ∈
{
(y1,y2) : y1 ∈ {0}n/2,y2 ∈ {−B, . . . , B}n/2
}
, and b − ay ∈ Zp
is close to the first component of values in T . If such a case occurs for a given
y and a given key-value pair (az, z) ∈ T , then we set s′ = z + y, and we com-
pute e′ = [b−as′]p. Finally, if we have e′ ≈B 0, then s′ is a likely candidate for s.
The difficult component of this attack lies in determining an efficient search
algorithm to find an element in T that is close to [b− ay]p, as is the case for the
same attack on LWE.
We achieve this by applying the Noisy Collision Search described by Cheon
et al. [10], with some slight adjustments to fit our problem. As such, the below
description is directly adapted from their approach.
Noisy Collision Search In order to efficiently split the search space, Cheon
et al. propose a locality sensitive hashing function sgn : Zq → {0, 1} defined
as sgn(x) = 1 for x ∈ {0, . . . , q2 − 1} and 0 otherwise. For y ∈ Zp, if there ex-
ists t ∈ Zp such that y ≈B t, then it is guaranteed that sgn(yi) = sgn(ti) if
yi ∈ VB = {− q−12 +B, . . . ,−B − 1} ∪ {B, . . . ,
q−1
2 −B} at a given index i.
To deal with the case when yi /∈ VB , Cheon et al. define a function sgn’ :
Zq → {0, 1,×} that returns sgn(y) if y ∈ VB , and × otherwise. × indicates that
the result may be either a 1 or a 0. It thus follows naturally that for any given
y ∈ Zp, for any t ∈ Zp such that y ≈B t, sgn(yi) = sgn(ti) for all i ∈ {i | yi ∈ VB}.
Meet-in-the-Middle Algorithm Our proposal makes use of two sub-algorithms
described in the work of Cheon et al., namely Preprocess and Search [10]. We
note that in our case, m = n and otherwise perform slight adjustments so as to
fit them to the Search version of our problem. The two algorithms detailed below
are thus nearly taken verbatim from the aforementioned paper, where the only
changes pertain to the content of T and H as well as the accumulation of the
results of Search in a list L. We define sgn(x) (respectively sgn’(x)) to denote
the application of sgn (respectively sgn’) to each of the components of x.
– Preprocess: On input T ⊂ Zp × Zp
1. Initialize an empty hash tableH with 2n (empty) linked lists with indexes
in {0, 1}n.
2. For each (t, z) ∈ T ,
(a) append (t, z) into the linked list indexed sgn(t).
3. Return non-empty linked lists H.
– Search: On input a hash table H, a query y ∈ {x | x ∈ Znq } and a distance
bound B,
1. Initialize an empty list L.
2. For each bin ∈ {0, 1}n obtained from sgn’(y) by replacing × by 0 or 1,
(a) If H has a linked list indexed bin, for each (t, z) in the list,
i. Check whether ‖y − t‖∞ ≤ B. If so, append z + y to L.
3. Return L.
Since our changes do not modify the core of the algorithms, we rely on the proof
of correctness provided for the original algorithms.
In the same way, we need to adapt the MITM algorithm provided by Cheon
et al. Pseudocode for this is given by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Meet-in-the-middle attack for Search I-RLWE
Input: A sample (a, b) ∈ Zp × Zp
(n, q) such that p = qn + 1
B ∈ Zq
Output: A list R of candidates for s
1 Initialize an empty list R
2 Compute T =
{
(av, v) : v = (x,y),x ∈ {−B, . . . , B}n/2,y ∈ {0}n/2
}
3 Run Preprocess on input T to have a hash table H
4 for y ∈ {x | x ∈ {−B, . . . , B}n/2} do
5 Concatenate the result of Search on input (H, b− ay,B) to R
6 return R
Since both e and s are sampled from the same distribution, we use the same
B for the construction of T and for the Search step of the attack. We study the
general complexity of the algorithm below.
Complexity Analysis According to the construction of T , we write NT =
|T | = (2B + 1)n/2. We assume that the insertion of an element into a linked list
has complexity O(1). Now, for each element in T , Preprocess needs to call sgn
n times. It follows that the time cost of Preprocess is NT · n.
Since the core of the algorithm didn’t change, we rely on the proof of Lemma
3 in the work of Cheon et al. [10], which determines that Search performs around
24nB/q lookups in T . Each one of these lookups returns a list of elements. We
are interested in counting the average number of elements contained in one of
the linked lists of H.
Proposition 1. Suppose that for (t, z) ∈ T , t comes from a uniform distribution
over Znq . Then, the average length of a given linked list in H is NT2n .
Search thus finds O(24nB/q · NT2n ) elements. Finally, it must compute ‖ · ‖∞
for each of them, which has O(n) cost.
We summarize these results in Table 1.
Table 1. Time cost for noisy search
Preprocess Search (per query)
NT · n O(24nB/q · NT2n · n)
The full MITM algorithm also consists of two phases. We denote by Tpre the
time complexity of the whole preprocessing phase (i.e. the building of T and
the call to Preprocess), and by Tsearch the time complexity of the whole search
phase, and give a cost estimation for them below:
– Tpre consists of roughly NT · n2 operations to build T , added to the cost of
executing Preprocess, thus Tpre = NT · (n+ n2 );
– Tsearch consists of NT queries to Search, thus Tsearch = O(NT ·24nB/q ·NT2n ·n).
Choice of B The choice of B affects both the probability of success and the
complexity of the MITM algorithm, where a higher accuracy necessarily means
a higher complexity. We can use the empirical rule of the normal distribution
to determine a good value for B. Take for example n = 256; according to the
construction of I-RLWE, we have σ =
√
n = 16. The empirical rule cited above
states that, if we setB = 3σ, PB = P(x ∈ {−B, . . . , B} : x ∼ N(0, σ)) ≈ 0.9973.
In that setting, the probability that ‖(s, e)‖∞ ≤ B (i.e. that the algorithm
succeeds) is about 0.9973512 ≈ 0.25. On the other hand, if we set B = 4σ, then
the algorithm will find the right secret with probability about 0.9999512 ≈ 0.95.
3.2 Lattice-Based Attack
Generally speaking, the most successful approach to solve LWE consists of con-
verting this problem into a hard lattice problem (e.g. uSVP) and then applying a
lattice reduction algorithm that solves it [3]. This approach also provides us with
estimates of the security of LWE against lattice attacks based on the complexity
of such reduction algorithms. Because of its similarity and connections to LWE,
it is natural to define a lattice-based attack to solve I-RLWE.
Consider an I-RLWE sample (a, b = as + e mod p). One wants to define a
lattice that, given a small enough standard deviation σ, contains the target vec-
tor v = (s, e, 1) as a shortest vector. Next, one applies a reduction algorithm on
a basis of such a lattice in order to find v.
Consider the following lattice:
L =








j − ub ≡ 0 mod p
 . (3)
By definition, we have that v ∈ L. Furthermore, its norm is expected to be
‖v‖ ≈ σ
√
2n. Let us find a basis for L. Define w(i) as the vector formed by the
components in base q of −aqi mod p, for i = 0, ..., n − 1. We indicate with W
the n× n matrix whose i-th row is the w(i) vector. We also define the matrix:
Q =

q −1 0 . . . 0 0







0 . . . 0 q −1 0
0 0 . . . 0 q −1
1 0 . . . 0 0 q

∈ Zn×n.











0 . . . 0 b0 . . . bn−1 1

∈ Z(2n+1)×(2n+1).
The rows of B form a basis for L and Vol(L) = |det(B)| = p.
Success Condition and Complexity The best reduction algorithm known
in practice is the Block-Korkine-Zolotarev (BKZ) algorithm [9]. This finds a
reduced basis by calling an SVP oracle in a smaller dimension β a polynomial
number of times [14].
By taking the analysis in [4] for the case of LWE as a model, we determine
the success condition as follows. The Geometric Series Assumption [8, 3] states
that a BKZ-reduced basis of a lattice L of dimension d is such that
‖b∗i ‖ = δd−2i−1β ·Vol(L)






Furthermore, the BKZ algorithm will detect the unique shortest vector of the
lattice if its projection onto Span{b∗d−β+1, ...,b∗d} is shorter than the norm of
b∗d−β . Let λ be the norm of the such projected vector. Then, the attack will
succeed if
λ ≤ δ2β−d−1β ·Vol(L)
1/d.
In our case, we have that d = 2n+1 and Vol(L) = p ≈ qn. The projection of our
target vector has expected norm σ
√
β. So, in order to succeed with the attack,
one must choose β to be such that
σ
√
β ≤ δ2(β−n−1)β q
1/2. (4)
Since the complexity of BKZ is mostly ruled by the calls to the SVP oracle
in dimension β, we only take the estimated complexity of this sub-routine into
consideration. In the literature, there are two main branches for SVP oracle
implementations: lattice sieving and lattice enumeration. Thanks to recent de-
velopments [5, 11, 16], lattice sieving took an asymptotic advantage over lattice
enumeration. For this reason, we will consider only the estimated complexity
provided by lattice sieving, that is ≈ 20.292β .
As in the literature for LWE and RLWE, we use the above estimate to de-
termine the theoretical security of I-RLWE for select parameters.
Remark 1. From the complexity estimates given above, it follows that the
lattice-based attack outlined here is more efficient than the meet-in-the-middle
attack.
4 Improved Lattice-Based Attack for Weak Choices of n
In Remark 4.1 of [12], Gu claims that n can be an arbitrary positive integer in-
stead of being of the form 2k when choosing q of the form 2t instead of a prime.
He justifies this different setting with more efficient encryption and decryption
processes in his protocol. In this subsection we introduce a new lattice-based
attack that exploits the fact that n is nor a prime, nor a power of 2.
Consider the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let n ∈ Z+ such that n = n̂k and let q be a positive integer. Then
qn + 1 ≡ 0 mod qn̂ + 1 if and only if k is odd.
Proof. Since n = n̂k we can rewrite qn+1 as (qn̂)k +1 and qn̂ ≡ −1 mod qn̂+1.
It follows that:
qn + 1 ≡ (qn̂)k + 1 ≡ (−1)k + 1 ≡ 0 mod qn̂ + 1⇔ k is odd.
Note. We believe Lemma 1 is a known result in Number Theory. However, we
could not find a reference for it.
Lemma 2. Take n, n̂ and q as in Lemma 1, and define p = qn+1 and p̂ = qn̂+1.
Let x ∈ Zp \ {p− 1} and x = (x0, ..., xn−1) be its representation in base q. Then
we have that x̂ = (x mod p̂) ∈ Zp̂ has the following representation in base q:
x̂ = (x̂0, x̂1, ..., x̂n̂−1) ,
where x̂i =
∑n/n̂−1
j=0 (−1)jxjn̂+i, for i = 0, ..., n̂− 1.
Proof. Trivially, qn̂ ≡ −1 mod p̂. By applying this reduction to x = x0 + x1q +
x2q
2 + ...+ xn−1q
n−1 we get the above representation of x̂.
Let n̂ be a divisor of n such that n/n̂ is odd. Then p̂ = qn̂ + 1 divides
p = qn + 1 (Lemma 2). Consider an I-RLWE sample (a, b = as + e mod p) and
let â = a mod p̂ and b̂ = b mod p̂. Thanks to the Chinese Remainder Theorem,
we have that
b̂ = âŝ+ ê mod p̂,
where ŝ (resp. ê) = s (resp. e) modp̂. In other words, it is possible to obtain a
new instance of the I-RLWE problem in a smaller dimension n̂ such that, thanks
to Lemma 2, we have that ŝ, ê ∼ DZn̂,σ̂, where σ̂ = σ
√
n/n̂.
The idea of this attack is to first solve the reduced problem using the lattice
attack explained in Subsection 3.2, then use Lemma 2 to perform a faster lattice
attack on the original problem.
Consider the following lattice:
L1 =








j − ub̂ ≡ 0 mod p̂
 . (5)
Analogously to the lattice defined in Subsection 3.2, L1 contains the reduced
target vector v̂ = (ŝ, ê, 1) and its volume is Vol(L1) = p̂ ≈ qn̂. One can apply
a lattice reduction algorithm to find v̂ and so the reduced secret ŝ and error ê.
Next, we define the following lattice:
L2 =
(x,y,u) ∈ Zn × Zn × Z3 :
x− u1ŝ ≡ 0 mod p̂,







j − u3b ≡ 0 mod p
 . (6)
This lattice contains the target vector v = (s, e,1), where 1 = (1, 1, 1), and, as
there are more conditions on its vectors, we expect it to have a higher volume
compared to the lattice defined by (3).
Writing a basis for L2 varies according to the relations between GCD(b, p),
GCD(ŝ, p̂) and GCD(ê, p̂) since some inversions modulo p and p̂ are required.
We show how to build a basis for the attacker’s best case scenario, i.e. when
GCD(b, p) = GCD(ŝ, p̂) = GCD(ê, p̂) = 1. We do not report the other cases for
conciseness.













0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 p̂ 0 0
0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 p̂ 0





i−1ŝ−1 mod p̂ i = 1, ..., n,
vi = q
i−1ê−1 mod p̂ i = 1, ..., n,
wi =
{
aqi−1b−1 mod p if i = 1, ..., n,
qi−1b−1 mod p if i = n+ 1, ..., 2n.
It’s easy to check that B2 is a basis of L2. In general, Vol(L2) is upper bounded
by pp̂2 ≈ qn+2n̂. This bound is reached in the aforementioned case (but not
only).
4.1 Analysis and Success Condition
In order for the attack to be successful, the reduced vector v̂ must be small
enough to be a shortest vector of L1. Using the Gaussian Heuristic, we check if
v̂ is shorter than the estimated shortest vector in L1:
‖v̂‖ ≈ σ̂
√

















In his paper, Gu suggested σ =
√
n and q > n3. In this setting, condition (7) is
satisfied.
We give a success condition on the block size β1 for the BKZ-β1 reduction al-




β1 ≤ δ2(β1−n̂−1)β1 · q
1/2.
Similarly, the target vector v will be found through a BKZ-β2 reduction on a
basis of L2 if the block size β2 is such that
σ
√
β2 ≤ δ2(β2−n−2)β2 · q
n+2n̂
2n+3 .
In the above expression we took Vol(L2) = pp̂2 ≈ qn+2n̂.
In Table 2 we show the significant advantage of using this approach over the
standard lattice attack described in Subsection 3.2 for some choices of n and n̂.
The complexity, based on the required cost for performing lattice sieving, drops
significantly. This allows us to conclude that n must not have odd divisors, that
is to say n is either a prime or a power of 2, in line with the setting of RLWE.
Table 2. Columns 1, 2 and 3 define the parameters, with σ =
√
n. Columns 4 and 7
contain the minimum block size (β and β2) of the BKZ subroutine required to find the
target vector v respectively from lattice (3) and (6). Column 6 contains the minimum
block size β1 to find v̂ from reducing a basis of lattice (5). The complexities in column
5 and 8 are expressed in log2 and correspond to the lattice sieving complexity with
parameter respectively β and β2
Parameters Standard Lattice Attack Improved Lattice Attack
n n̂ q β Complexity β1 β2 Complexity
2000 400 233 987 288 130 561 164
1500 300 232 713 208 83 396 116
1200 240 231 559 163 < 60 304 89
1000 200 230 463 135 < 60 246 71
Remark 2. This attack can be further improved when n has more than one odd
divisor by adding more conditions in the definition of L2.
Remark 3. We remark that these choices of n remain weak for any q and not
only in the setting that Gu proposes.
5 Experiments
In order to confirm our theoretical results, we performed some practical experi-
ments which we report in this section.
First we generated some I-RLWE samples, then we used the BKZ implemen-
tation contained in the General Sieve Kernel [2], the cutting-edge implementation
at the moment of writing, in order to perform the attacks. Finally we compared
the minimum block size parameter β of the BKZ reduction required to success-
fully retrieve the secret and the error for both approaches. For each instance,
we chose n̂ among the possible choices so that the uSVP on L1 is solvable with
LLL.
In the table below we report the results obtained during our experiments.
The I-RLWE samples that we used in our experiments can be found at
https://archive.org/details/irlwesamples.
Table 3. Columns 1, 2 and 3 define the parameters, with σ =
√
n. Column 3 report
the minimum block size β that allowed us to retrieve the target vector v through
BKZ reduction on the lattice defined in (3). Similarly, columns 4 and 5 report the
minimum block sizes β1 and β2 for lattices (5) and (6) respectively, so that the attack
was successful. Note that β1 = 1 corresponds to LLL.
Parameters Standard Lattice Attack Improved Lattice Attack
n n̂ q β β1 β2
130 26 222 41 1 2
110 22 221 28 1 2
105 15 221 9 1 2
6 Conclusion
In this work, we adapted a meet-in-the-middle attack and a lattice-based attack
from LWE to I-RLWE. The latter, as in the case of LWE and RLWE, gives us
theoretical estimates regarding the security provided by I-RLWE.
We introduced a new lattice-based attack against I-RLWE when the param-
eter n is chosen as a composite number divisible by an odd number. This attack
exploits the weakness on choice of n to build a new lattice of bigger volume,
leading to a more efficient secret and error recovery through lattice reduction.
We provided theoretical estimates of our attack showing how the complexity of
solving I-RLWE reduces in this setting. For example, for n = 2000 the com-
plexity reduces from 2288, estimated with the standard lattice attack, to 2164.
Moreover, this gap also appears for smaller n as in the case for n = 1000 where
the complexity drops from 2135 to 271. This attack likely applies to RLWE; how-
ever, this was not investigated as the setting considered here is avoided in the
literature of RLWE-based protocols.
To confirm our theoretical results, we run experiments for n up to 130. Our
results shows that a much smaller block-size parameter β is required in the BKZ
lattice reduction algorithm in order to successfully recover the secret and the
error.
We conclude remarking that choices of n as in the aforementioned case must
definitely be avoided in I-RLWE, as is prescribed for RLWE.
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